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Theoretical physics today is confronted with a challenge reminiscent of the one Newton’s predeces-
sors faced in the 17th century: two incompatible theories quite successfully describe two different
domains of phenomena. The laws of quantum mechanics govern the small-scale phenomena of el-
ementary particle physics, and the laws of general relativity (GR) encode the large-scale structure
of the universe. The present challenge of quantum gravity is that of completing the revolution that
took place in physics in the last century; the task is no less than to fuse the two incommensurable
frameworks of quantum physics and GR. Many protagonists in this endeavour hope that meeting
this challenge will amount to a substantive, and perhaps final, step toward the theoretical unifica-
tion in fundamental physics. This Herculean task has attracted more physicists today than ever
before, plugging the ground, prospecting to find the gold mine leading to the holy grail. Their
efforts have yielded a rich variety of approaches, techniques, and theories and include, most promi-
nently, string theory and loop quantum gravity (LQG). Despite these exciting new developments in
physics, philosophers have been remarkably slow at engaging the conceptually and philosophically
rich material that has been unearthed in the process.
This paper issues a call to arms and seeks to entice the reader with some of the most captivating
philosophical puzzles arising in quantum gravity. The analysis will be prefaced, in Section 1, by
general considerations concerning the need for finding a quantum theory of gravity and the methods
used in the pursuit of this goal. After mapping the field in Section 2, I will introduce LQG as an
important competitor and particularly rich source of philosophical trouble in Section 3. The so-
called problem of time, i.e. the puzzle that no genuine physical quantity can change, is discussed
in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 analyzes how the familiar continuous spacetime structure might
re-emerge from the fundamental, non-spatiotemporal structure.
1 Why quantum gravity?
Before we embark upon an investigation of the foundations of quantum gravity, we ought to convince
ourselves that a theory of quantum gravity is indeed necessary. A quantum theory of gravity is any
consistent theory which combines gravity with a quantum description of matter. It is important
to note that this does not entail that a quantum theory of gravity must regard gravity itself as
quantized. It is at least conceivable that such a theory marries a classical understanding of gravity
with a quantum understanding of matter. As important methodological constraints on a quantum
theory of gravity, we demand that it has the “appropriate limits,” i.e. at scales where the quantum
nature of matter becomes irrelevant, the theory ought to merge into GR, and in regimes in which
gravity is weak, it ought to turn into a quantum theory.1
1More precisely, it ought to turn into a quantum field theory on the Minkowski spacetime of special relativity.
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But why does physics need a quantum theory of gravity at all? The usual answer to this
question is a combination of the following three (groups of) arguments. First, it is often claimed
that such a theory is necessitated by a demand for unification. Based on its successful history in
physics, unification has exerted a great methodological attraction to many. James Clerk Maxwell
unified electric and magnetic forces into a dynamical theory of electromagnetism in the 1870s.
In the 1960s, Abdus Salam, Sheldon Glashow, and Steven Weinberg formulated the electroweak
theory, unifying electrodynamics and the weak nuclear force associated with radioactivity. Next,
quantum chromodynamics, describing the strong nuclear force binding the nuclei of atoms and
their constituents, and the electroweak theory have been unified into the standard model of particle
physics, which successfully accounts for three of the four fundamental forces in physics. It is thus a
natural ambition to attempt a unification of the quantum theories of the standard model with GR,
our currently best theory of the remaining force—gravity. While its venerable history legitimizes
unification as a methodological desideratum—and, to some extent, as a research programme—, it
does not justify it as a metaphysical dogma. The past success of unification does not entail that
nature must be sufficiently unified as to allow a single fundamental theory to underwrite all of
physics. Thus, it remains perfectly conceivable that nature is disunified in the sense that gravity
is not subsumable under the quantum umbrella of particle physics.
The second answer trades on the singularity theorems proven in the 1960s and 1970s by Stephen
Hawking, Roger Penrose, and Robert Geroch, which firmly establish that singularities are generic
in classical GR. Many authors have argued that GR loses its validity “there” and that it thus
contains the seeds of its own destruction. Therefore, the argument goes, a replacement is needed
and a quantum theory of gravity is expected to fill that gap. More particularly, quantizing gravity,
i.e. describing gravity as having a quantum nature itself is believed by some to dissolve singularities
such as the big bang. But why should this argument, at least by itself, have much force? In GR,
singularities are not part of the spacetime fabric, i.e. they are not “at” a particular “location,” and
hence there is no need to have a valid theory “there” as far as GR is concerned. GR is a perfectly
consistent theory within the realm of its applicability and it does not, therefore, contain the seeds
of its own destruction. At least, these seeds cannot bear any dialectical fruit without a whole lot
of additional argumentative fertilizer.
Third, and by far most compellingly, there are phenomena for which we have good reason to
believe that both gravity as well as quantum effects matter and that thus both are ineliminable
ingredients to a theory which successfully describes these phenomena. Most importantly, these
phenomena include the dynamics of black holes and the very early universe. It is important to
appreciate that while both phenomena involve—in their classical description—a singularity, the
necessity for a quantum theory of gravity does not arise because of this. Rather, the small scales
and the high densities of matter and the simultaneous presence of a strong gravitational field jointly
necessitate such a theory. Ultimately, it is thus the existence of rather extreme phenomena, and
not some methodological or aesthetic criteria, that drive the need for a quantum theory of gravity.
Note that while quantizing gravity—if successful—lends itself rather straightforwardly to a
quantum theory of gravity, it is not necessary to obtain a quantum theory of gravity. The existence
of regimes in which both quantum effects of matter and strong gravitational fields play an important
role does not imply that gravity must be quantum itself. Instead, we only need a theory that governs
the “interaction” between the quantum matter and the possibly classical gravity. In other words,
so-called “semi-classical” theories of gravity have not been ruled out by anything said up to this
point, even though they violate principles of GR.
Having driven the wedge between the issues of whether we need a quantum theory of gravity
and whether gravity needs to be quantized, I hasten to add that there are a number of arguments
that pertain to show that in any quantum theory of gravity, gravity must be quantized and that
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thus, semi-classical approaches are not feasible. Typically, these arguments attempt to derive a
contradiction with a well-entrenched physical principle such as the correspondence principle or the
conservation of energy from the assumption of classical gravity interacting with quantum matter.
However, I am not aware of any such argument which fully succeeds without invoking additional
assumptions that an advocate of a semi-classical approach need not accept.2
Having secured the need for a quantum theory of gravity, let me then press on to briefly map
the main competing approaches to quantum gravity.
2 Mapping the field: approaches to quantum gravity
Introducing a helpful taxonomic scheme, Chris Isham (1994) proposed to divide the many ap-
proaches to formulating a full, i.e. not semi-classical, quantum theory of gravity into four broad types
of approaches: first, those quantizing GR; second, those “general-relativizing” quantum physics;
third, construct a conventional quantum theory including gravity and regard GR as its low-energy
limit; and fourth, consider both GR and conventional quantum theories of matter as low-energy
limits of a radically novel fundamental theory. Let us briefly consider each group in turn.
The first family of strategies starts out from classical GR and seek to apply, in a mathemati-
cally rigorous and physically principled way, a “quantization” procedure, i.e. a recipe for cooking
up a quantum theory from a classical theory such as GR. Of course, quantization proceeds, meta-
physically speaking, backwards in that it starts out from the dubious classical theory—which is
found to be deficient and hence in need of replacement—and tries to erect the sound building of
a quantum theory of gravity on its ruin. But it should be understood, just like Wittgenstein’s
ladder, as a methodologically promising means to an end. Quantization procedures have success-
fully been applied elsewhere in physics and produced, among others, important theories such as
quantum electrodynamics. Advocates of approaches in this family hope to repeat these successes
in gravitational physics.
The first family consists of two genera, the now mostly defunct covariant ansatz3 and the
vigorous canonical quantization approach. A canonical quantization requires that the theory to be
quantized is expressed in a particular formalism, the so-called constrained Hamiltonian formalism.
How casting GR as a constrained Hamiltonian system lies at the heart of its most perplexing
conceptual issues will be discussed below. Loop quantum gravity (LQG) is the most prominent
representative of this camp, but there are other approaches.
Secondly, there is to date no promising avenue to gaining a full quantum theory of gravity by
“general-relativizing” quantum (field) theories, i.e. by employing techniques that permit the full
incorporation of the lessons of GR into a quantum theory. The only existing representative of
this approach consists of attempts to formulate a quantum field theory on a curved rather than
the usual flat background spacetime. The general idea of this approach is to incorporate, in some
local sense, GR’s principle of general covariance. It is important to note that, however, that the
background spacetime, curved though it may be, is in no way dynamic. In other words, it cannot
be interpreted, as it can in GR, to interact with the matter fields.
The third group also takes quantum physics as its vantage point, but instead of directly incor-
porating the lessons of GR, attempts to extend quantum physics with means as conventional as
possible in order to include gravity. GR, it is hoped, will then drop out of the resulting theory
in its low-energy limit. By far the most promising member of this family is string theory, which,
2Cf. Callender and Huggett (2001), Huggett and Callender (2001), Mattingly (2006), and Wu¨thrich (2005).
3Defunct because covariant quantizations of GR are not perturbatively renormalizable, a flaw usually considered
fatal. This is not to say, however, that covariant techniques don’t play a role in contemporary quantum gravity.
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however, goes well beyond conventional quantum field theory, both methodologically and in terms
of ambition. Despite its extending the assumed boundaries of the family, string theory still takes
conventional quantum field theory as its vantage point, both historically and systematically, and
does not attempt to build a novel theory of quantum gravity dissociated from “old” physics. Again,
there are other approaches in this family, such as topological quantum field theory, but none of
them musters substantial support among physicists.
The fourth and final group of the Ishamian taxonomy is most aptly characterized by its icon-
oclastic attitude. For the heterodox approaches of this type, no known physics serves as starting
point; rather, radically novel perspectives are considered in an attempt to formulate a quantum
theory of gravity ab initio. As far as I aware, these approaches only suggest programmatic schemes,
rather than full-fledged theories. They derive their attraction mostly from the daunting appearance
of deep incompatibility of the guiding principles of the quantum physics of the very small and the
GR of the very large. This incompatibility, it is argued, cannot be resolved unless a radically fresh
start is undertaken.
All these approaches have their attractions and hence their following. But all of them also
have their deficiencies. To list them comprehensively would go well beyond the present endeav-
our. Apart from the two major challenges for LQG, which I will discuss subsequently, I shall be
content to emphasize that a major problem common to all of them is their complete lack of a real
connection to observations or experiments. There are some proposals how some or all approaches
may make contact with the empirical, but so far these proposals do not go beyond often rather
speculative suggestions of how such contact may be established. Either the theory is too flexible
so as to be able to accommodate almost any empirical data, such as string theory’s predictions of
supersymmetric particles which have been constantly revised in light of particle detectors’ failures
to find them at the predicted energies or as string theory’s embarras de richesses, the now noto-
rious “landscape problem” of choosing among 10500 different models. Or the connection between
the mostly understood data and the theories is highly tenuous and controversial, such as the issue
of how—and whether—data narrowly confining possible violations of Lorentz symmetry relate to
theories of quantum gravity predicting or assuming a discrete spacetime structure that is believed
to violate, or at least modify, the Lorentz symmetry so well confirmed at larger scales. Or the
predictions made by the theories are only testable in experimental regimes so far removed from
present technological capacities, such as the predictions of LQG that spacetime is discrete at the
Planck level at a quintillion (1018) times the energy scales probed by the Large Hadron Collider at
CERN. Or simply no one remotely has a clue as to how the theory might connect to the empirical,
such as is the case for the inchoate approaches of the fourth group like causal set theory.
3 Introducing loop quantum gravity
LQG is, apart from string theory, the most important approach to quantum gravity, both in terms
of promise and of numbers of followers. It is a canonical approach which takes classical GR—our
best classical theory of gravity—as its starting point and applies a well-tested procedure of cooking
up a quantum theory from a classical theory in the hope that this will result in a viable quantum
theory of gravity. It is an essentially conservative approach in that it aspires to remain as faithful
as possible to known and successful physics.
For the quantization procedure of choice—the so-called canonical quantization—to get some
traction, it is necessary to reformulate GR as a Hamiltonian system. A Hamiltonian system is
a physical system that obeys Hamilton’s equations, which are the differential equation relating
the (generalized) positions and the (generalized) momenta (the so-called canonical variables) of all
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physical degrees of freedom to the system’s energy and thereby giving the temporal evolution of
all the system’s degrees of freedom.4 It turns out that a vast and important class of dynamical
physical systems obey Hamilton’s equation and can thus be cast as Hamiltonian systems.
GR in its usual formulation is not a Hamiltonian system. At the heart of standard GR, we
find the so-called Einstein field equations which relate the geometry of spacetime, encoded in the
metric field, to the distribution of matter and energy in it. They are often interpreted to describe
a dynamical interaction between gravity as captured by the metric field and the energy-matter
distribution.5 John Wheeler’s famous dictum that in GR, mass grips spacetime, telling it how
to curve, and spacetime grips mass, telling it how to move,6 epitomizes this interpretation of the
Einstein field equations as governing the dynamical co-evolution of the spacetime metric and the
matter fields. We will have to return to this interpretation of GR in the next section when we
discuss the problem of time.
A solution of the Einstein field equations is a triple 〈M, g, T 〉 of a four-dimensional differentiable
manifoldM, a metric field g, and a so-called stress-energy tensor T , which expresses mathematically
the distribution of matter and energy on the manifold, such that g and T relate to one another in
accordance to the Einstein field equations at every point of M. On the face of it, therefore, the
Einstein equations are not dynamical equations; rather, they simply give local conditions on pairs
of values of the metric field g and the energy and matter content of the universe as captured by
T . But formulating GR as a Hamiltonian system requires that it be understood dynamically. In a
dynamical theory, one would expect to be able to articulate a well-posed initial value formulation,
i.e. a formulation of the theory that would enable us to obtain the full dynamical evolution of
the physical system for all times given a fully specified set of initial conditions at some time and
the dynamical equations. A Hamiltonian formulation of GR affords a natural connection to the
initial value problem. This problem, however, is not well-posed in the standard formulation of
GR since the thus necessitated split of four-dimensional spacetime into “space” that evolves over
“time” appears to violate the very central lesson of relativity according to which such a split
cannot be physically well-motivated. This forced split of spacetime fosters incipient concerns that
a dynamical understanding of GR caters to a misinterpretation of it. But even though Hamiltonian
GR requires “foliating” spacetime into three-dimensional “spaces” ordered by a one-dimensional
“time” parameter, the relativistic lesson of four-dimensionality is mathematically accommodated
in the Hamiltonian framework in its constraint equations, on which more below.
There are various ways in which GR might be “dynamized” in order to obtain a Hamiltonian
version of the theory. Generally, the idea is to find canonical coordinates that somehow capture a
spatial geometry changing over time. To that end, Hamiltonian formulations of GR slice the space-
time into a foliation of three-dimensional spatial hypersurfaces (which are spacelike submanifolds
of M). Traditionally, the standard way of doing this is named ADM formalism after its founders
Richard Arnowitt, Stanley Deser, and Charles Misner. The ADM formalism takes the three-metrics
induced by g on the spatial hypersurfaces as the “position” variables and (a linear combination
of components of) the exterior curvature of these hypersurfaces encoding their embedding into
the four-dimensional spacetime as “momentum” variables, which are canonically conjugate to the
three-metrics. Hamilton’s equations can then be written down.
It turns out, however, that they are not, by themselves, equivalent to Einstein’s field equations.
4More precisely, they are a system of first-order differential equations expressing the dynamical constraints on the
2n-dimensional phase space of the system, where n is the number of degrees of freedom.
5Mathematically, they are a system of ten independent non-linear second-order partial differential equations which
reduce to six independent equations when the freedom of choice of spacetime coordinates is taken into account. Four
of the ten equations are constraints related to the four-dimensional diffeomorphism invariance, more on which below.
6Wheeler’s quip appears in many of his writings, cf. e.g. Wheeler (1990, xi).
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For the equivalence to hold, additional equations constraining the relation between the canonical
variables must be appended to Hamilton’s equations. These constraint equations testify to the
fact that initial data cannot be chosen arbitrarily, but must satisfy certain conditions.7 It can
be shown that these constraint equations are a mathematical expression of the presence of so-
called “gauge freedom,” i.e. a representational redundancy in the mathematical description of the
physical situation.8 In particular, they arise as a consequence of the fact that the group of four-
dimensional diffeomorphisms is the dynamical symmetry group of GR as the principle of general
covariance demands.9 General covariance is the requirement that the physics remains unchanged
if the fields—including the metric field—are all smoothly pushed around the manifold in the same
way. The idea behind the demand for general covariance is thus that although the mathematical
expression for the unpushed and the pushed situation will differ, the physical situation is identical
in both cases.
In fact, two (families of) constraint equations arise. The first, encoding the freedom to choose
the foliation, is the so-called Hamiltonian constraint. It turns out that the Hamiltonian of the
usual Hamilton’s equations is itself a constraint.10 Thus, one can see that the absence of an
external fiducial time leads to the “dynamical” equation being itself a constraint, connected to a
freedom of choosing a gauge that has no observable consequences. The second—there are three—,
related the freedom to choose spatial coordinates in three-space, are called vector constraints. This
gives a total of four constraint equations.
Once a Hamiltonian formulation of classical GR has been found, i.e. once we have identified
canonical variables and written down all constraint equations they must satisfy, one can crank the
classical theory through the procedure of canonical quantization, as outlined by Paul Dirac (1964).
The main idea is to take the canonical variables and turn then into quantum operators acting on
a space of quantum states. Their relational structure, as encoded by the Poisson bracket at the
classical level, morphs into the canonical commutation relations between the basic operators and
the constraint equations become wave equations of constraint operators functionally identical to
the classical constraint functions acting on the quantum states. Only those quantum states which
satisfy these quantum constraint equations then qualify as physically admissible states.
Attempts to use the ADM formalism to gain a quantum theory of gravity via canonical quan-
tization have been frustrated by insurmountable technical complications, such as the fact that the
constraint equations are non-polynomial. For a moment, then, it looked as if attempts to use
canonical quantization to obtain a quantum theory of gravity from GR were fatally doomed. But
in the 1980s, new variables were found by Abhay Ashtekar based on work by Amitabha Sen. These
Ashtekar variables simplified the constraint equations significantly,11 even though the direct geomet-
ric significance of the ADM variables was lost. I will spare you with the mathematical details—these
can be found in any decent review of LQG.12 Let me just mention that the basic idea is that the
spacetime geometry is captured by a “triad field” encoding the local inertial frames defined on the
spatial hypersurfaces, rather than the three-metrics. Both approaches equally capture the space-
time geometry and are intertranslatable, even though there is an additional family of constraints in
LQG related to internal symmetries. In essence, the move from ADM to Ashtekar variables amounts
7For details on the AMD formalism and how the constraint equations arise there, cf. Wald (1984, Chapter 10 and
Appendix E.2).
8Cf. Wu¨thrich (2006, Section 4.1).
9A diffeomorphism is a bijective and smooth map between differentiable manifolds whose inverse is also smooth.
10I am glossing over some details here: strictly speaking, it is a linear combination of constraints of both families.
But this doesn’t change the fact that it is gauge-generating constraint.
11Even though the simplification depends on a number of contentious and yet unresolved technical issues.
12Rovelli (2004) is the standard textbook.
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Figure 1: Spin network states can be represented by labelled graphs.
to a reinterpretation of the Einstein field equations as statements about a “connection”—a math-
ematical means of describing what happens to tangent vectors to a manifold that are transported
from one point of the manifold to another along a curve—rather than about a metric. The thus
reinterpreted general theory of relativity is then subjected to the canonical quantization procedure
as outlined above.
As it turns out, not all constraint equations can easily be solved. In fact, only two of the
three families of constraint equations have so far been solved. Let me define the physical Hilbert
space as the space of all quantum states of the theory that solve all the constraints and thus ought
to be considered as the physical states. This implies that the physical Hilbert space of LQG is
not yet known. The larger space of states which satisfy the first two families of constraints is
often termed the kinematical Hilbert space. The one constraint that has so far resisted resolution
is the Hamiltonian constraint equation with the seemingly simple form Hˆ|ψ〉 = 0, the so-called
Wheeler-DeWitt equation, where Hˆ is the Hamiltonian operator usually interpreted to generate the
dynamical evolution and |ψ〉 is a quantum state in the kinematical Hilbert space. Of course, the
Hamiltonian operator Hˆ is a complicated function(al) of the basic operators corresponding to the
basic canonical variables. In fact, the very functional form of Hˆ is debated as several inequivalent
candidates are on the table. Insofar as the physical Hilbert space has thus not yet been constructed,
LQG remains incomplete.
Since the physical Hilbert space is a subspace of the kinematical Hilbert space, all physical
states are also elements in the kinematical Hilbert space. Fortunately, much more is known about
this space. Its elements are the spin network states, the quantum states of the gravitational field,
at least as it is spatially distributed. Spin network states can be represented by labelled graphs
embedded in some background space, cf. Figure 1. Physical space is supposed to be, fundamentally,
a spin network state or a quantum superposition of such states.13
The structure of physical space, therefore, is essentially captured by labelled graphs as in Figure
1. As is indicated there, “spin”-representations sit on the vertices of the graph (represented by
13More precisely, since spin network states are not invariant under diffeomorphisms, equivalence classes of spin
network states under three-dimensional diffeomorphisms must be taken to encode the fundamental structure of
physical space. That spin network states are not diffeomorphism-invariant can be seen from the fact that, strictly
speaking, pushing (part of) them around the embedding space without changing their knot structure as indicated by
the arrows in Figure 1 yields a distinct spin network state each time. But since the invariant knot structure captures
the physical situation and not its particular embedding in another space, we must look, again strictly speaking,
at what mathematicians call abstract graphs, i.e. equivalence classes of graphs with the same knot structure but
embedded differently. This subtle but important point will be ignored in what follows.
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the nodes) as well as on the edges (represented by the lines connecting the nodes). The spin-
representations on the vertices, denoted by ik, correspond to quantum numbers indicating the
“size” of the “space atoms,” while those on the edges, labelled by jl, correspond to the “size” of the
surface connecting adjacent “chunks” of space. Spin network states are discrete structures. It can
thus be seen that, according to LQG, physical space is granular at the tiny Planck scale. Thus, the
smooth space of the classical theory is supplanted by a discrete quantum structure. Hence, space
as it figures in our conceptions of the world is an emergent phenomenon, not a fundamental reality.
Or so LQG claims.
The two most pressing problems of LQG are our lack of understanding of the dynamics or,
equivalently, our inability to solve the Hamiltonian constraint equation as well as our failure to
give an account of how the classical smooth spacetime emerges or, equivalently, of how classical
gravitational theories such as GR have been as successful as they were. Both of these problems
have technical as well as philosophical aspects, and both appear in one guise or another in many
of the main approaches to quantum gravity. For instance, the technical problem of solving the
Hamiltonian constraint equation in LQG is closely tied to the problem of time, which has many
philosophical dimensions. Moreover, to the extent to which string theory contains GR, it must
also deal with the problem of time at least at the very general level at which a resolution of the
conceptual tension between the pre-relativistic notion of a time external to, and independent of,
the physical system at stake employed in quantum theories and in string theory on the one hand
and the relativistic reconceptualization of time as a physical actor fused with space and interacting
with matter fields and other forms of energy on the other. Naturally, however, the precise form the
problem takes will differ, sometimes quite radically, from approach to approach. These two major
issues shall be treated separately in the two remaining sections, with an eye on the conceptual and
philosophical angles.
4 The problem of time
The Presocratic philosopher Parmenides of Elea famously maintained that, fundamentally, the
world is an immutable, unchanging, uncreated, indestructible whole. Changes, he argued, are
merely apparent and what exists in reality is temporally “frozen.” Particularly in recent centuries,
few philosophers followed Parmenides in his radical metaphysics. Surprisingly, his brave hypothesis
garners support from (Hamiltonian) GR and the quantum theories of gravity based on it.
Already in (standard) GR, isolating physical time is far from trivial and in general, time—
whatever its nature—only induces a preorder of temporal precedence on the set of events on the
manifold. A preorder is a two-place relation Rxy on a set X, which is reflexive and transitive, but in
general neither weakly antisymmetric nor comparable. Weak antisymmetry is the condition that for
any two events a and b, if event a temporally precedes b (which is read as to include the possibility
of their being simultaneous), and b temporally precedes a, then they are simultaneous. Unless
time is circular or have some funny topology, weak antisymmetry will hold and is thus generally
considered a necessary condition for a legitimately temporal ordering. But time in GR is not weakly
antisymmetric since there may be pairs of events which exemplify the temporal precedence relation
in both orders without the events being simultaneous. It is also not comparable because pairs of
spacelike related events will not stand in a temporally ordered relation at all, which they would have
to in order for comparability to hold. Weak antisymmetry can be salvaged for those spacetimes
with topology Σ × R, where Σ is any three-dimensional space, R are the real numbers, and ×
designates the Cartesian product. Spacetimes of this topology can thus be split into “space” and
“time,” even though in general there will be infinitely many equally valid ways of performing such a
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split. Only if one foliation, i.e. one particular way of splitting, can be privileged in some physically
principled way can comparability, and thus totality, of the ordering relation be regained.
Since Hamiltonian GR demands that we foliate spacetime into a spatial system which then
evolves over time, it can only deal with spacetimes of topology Σ × R. It may thus appear as if
the difficulty with time may be alleviated in Hamiltonian GR (and consequently in approaches to
quantum gravity deriving from it) as compared to standard GR. But this impression is deceptive;
in fact, things stand much worse. There is a sense in which time completely evaporates, and all
physical magnitudes are bound to remain constant over time.
Concerning the complete disappearance of time in canonical quantum gravity, it was noted
by Wheeler and Bryce DeWitt in the 1960s that the basic dynamical equation, their eponymous
equation stated above, does not contain a time parameter. Unlike the Schro¨dinger equation
Hˆ|ψ〉 = i~ ∂
∂t
|ψ〉,
which gives the dynamics in non-relativistic quantum mechanics, its right-hand side vanishes and
there is no time parameter t. As far as canonical quantum theories of gravity are concerned,
therefore, time simply falls out of the picture. The disappearance of time in the dynamical equations
of the canonical approach can be regarded as testimony to the conceptual tension that anyone faces
when attempting to marry the stripped-down version of time in general-relativistic spacetimes with
the external time, flowing equably and completely independently of the physical systems whose
evolution it enables, that we find in quantum mechanics. Perhaps this is a consequence of the
fact that time was part of the physical system, viz. spacetime, which we quantized. In relativistic
physics, there is certainly no external fiducial time with respect to which the dynamics could “play
out.” But to read off the Wheeler-DeWitt equation that there is no time at all, however, is a bit
too quick. It may still be there, of course, but in a way such that the dynamics may not be wearing
it on its sleeves, as would only be appropriate in relativistic physics.
Some physicists like Carlo Rovelli and Julian Barbour, however, have embraced the radical
conclusion and have consequently attempted to formulate quantum mechanics in a way that does
not require an external time clocking down the dynamics, but rather substitutes time by relating
events directly to one another.14 That there is no time at the quantum level may be acceptable
without giving in to the demand that quantum mechanics be relational, as long as GR is found to
be capable of describing change and if we come to understand how classical spacetime emerges from
the underlying quantum structure or, equivalently, how classical GR is valid in some low-energy
limit as an approximation to LQG. GR can easily deliver on the first part of the condition: while
time in general does not even yield an objective, universally valid partial ordering of events, a
relational account of change as the variation of properties of physical system along their worldlines
can be given in GR. The second part, however, has no easy resolution, as will be seen in Section 5.
But while change can be accounted for in the standard version of GR, there is another aspect
of the problem of time which indicates that the appearance one gets in canonical quantum gravity
that there is no time is not deceptive after all insofar as there is no change at the most fundamental
level of physical reality.15 In its Hamiltonian formulation, GR can thus not even accommodate
change of physical systems in their properties. We see that the problem of time, or at least that of
change, already arises at the classical level, even though only in one formulation of GR. Parmenides,
it seems, is vindicated after all: there is no change, everything really is just frozen in—if I may say
so—time.
14For the canonical refence on “relational quantum mechanics,” see Rovelli (1996); for a popular account, see
Callender (2010).
15Cf. Wu¨thrich (2006, §4.3).
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Formally, this results from the fact that the reparametrization of (space-)time is a gauge sym-
metry of the theory. Specifically, the dynamical symmetry group of the Einstein equations is
Diff(M), the group of four-dimensional diffeomorphisms on M, which gets encoded in the Hamil-
tonian formulation as constraints that generate these spatiotemporal diffeomorphisms. In other
words, change is nothing but a redundancy of the mathematical representation. At heart, the
problem results from the demand that all physical magnitudes cannot depend on the mathematical
representation—more specifically, the particular coordinate system—employed to describe what is
physically really going on. This demand is eminently reasonable, since changes in the representa-
tion will have no observable consequences. The physics is there and is the same, regardless of which
coordinate system we humans use to describe it.
Despite this very counterintuitive conclusion, the argument in the preceding paragraph needs to
be taken seriously, as John Earman (2002) urges.16 Its conclusion has not been reached frivolously
and a strong case can be made for each of the steps in the argument. It should thus not be
dismissed easily. A straightforward way to brush away the unpalatable conclusion would of course
be to reject the Hamiltonian formulation of GR as physically irrelevant, as Tim Maudlin (2002)
seems to do. In fact, the consequences into which it forces us may be considered a reductio ad
absurdum of the entire approach. But that would be too quick: canonical quantization has been
enormously successful in other domains such as in electrodynamics and offers at least a principled
and mathematically relatively well-controlled path to the holy grail of quantum gravity.
There are a number of proposals as to how to deal with the problem of time, as is testified
by the overwhelming response of physicists and philosophers alike to the essay competition on the
nature of time issued by the Foundational Questions Institute (FQXi).17 I will not review these
proposals here, but suffice it to say that as variegated the responses to the problem of time may be,
as strong is the consensus that substantive progress in fundamental physics is unlikely without a
sustained reflection on the nature of time and its role in quantum gravity. Whichever position one
assumes in the debate, one other thing is also quite clear: that an understanding of how classical
spacetime emerges from the fundamental non-spatio-temporal quantum structure will shed light on
the problem of time.
5 The disappearance and re-emergence of spacetime
In string theory as well as in LQG, and in other approaches to quantum gravity, indications are
coalescing that not only time, but also space is no longer a fundamental entity, but merely an
“emergent” phenomenon that arises from the basic physics. In the language of physics, spacetime
theories such as GR are “effective” theories and spacetime itself is “emergent,” much like ther-
modynamics is an effective theory and temperature is an emergent property at the effective level,
as it is built up from the collective behaviour of gas molecules. However, unlike the notion that
temperature is emergent, the idea that the universe is not in space and time arguably shocks our
very idea of physical existence as profoundly as any scientific revolution ever did. It is not even
clear whether we can coherently formulate a physical theory in the absence of space and time.18
Space disappears in LQG insofar as the physical structures it describes bear little, if any, re-
semblance to the spatial geometries found in GR. As we have seen in Section 3, these structures
are discrete and not continuous as classical spacetimes are. They represent the fundamental con-
stitution of our universe that correspond, somehow, to chunks of physical space and thus give
16But there are dissenters: cf. Maudlin (2002).
17Cf. e.g. Barbour (2008), Kiefer (2008), and Rovelli (2008).
18Maudlin (2007) doesn’t seem to think so.
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rise—in a way yet to be elucidated—to the spatial geometries we find in classical GR. It should be
emphasized that the fact that spacetime is replaced by a discrete structure at the quantum level
is a well-established and quite generic consequence of a few basic postulates shared by a rather
vast class of quantum theories of gravity, including LQG.19 The conceptual problem of coming to
grasp how to do physics in the absence of an underlying spatio-temporal stage on which the physics
can play out is closely tied to the technical difficulty of mathematically relating LQG back to GR.
Physicists have yet to fully understand how classical spacetimes emerge from the fundamental non-
spatio-temporal structure of LQG, and philosophers are only just starting to study its conceptual
foundations and the implications of quantum gravity in general and of the disappearance of space-
time in particular.20 Even though the mathematical heavy-lifting will fall to the physicists, there
is a role for philosophers here in exploring and mapping the landscape of conceptual possibilites,
bringing to bear the immense philosophical literature in emergence and reduction which offers a
variegated conceptual toolbox. Let me say a few preliminary words, in closing, toward mapping a
scheme for a resolution of these problems.
To understand how classical spacetime re-emerges from the fundamental quantum structure
involves what the physicists call “taking the classical limit.” In a sense, relating the spin network
states of LQG back to the spacetimes of GR is a reversal of the quantization procedure employed
to formulate the quantum theory in the first place. Thus, while the quantization can be though of
as the “context of discovery,” finding the classical limit that relates the quantum theory of gravity
to GR should be considered the “context of (partial) justification.” It should be emphasized that
understanding how (classical) spacetime re-emerges by retrieving GR as a low-energy limit of a
more fundamental theory is not only important to “save the appearances” and to accommodate
common sense—although it matters in these respects as well—, but must also be considered a
methodologically central part of the enterprise of quantum gravity. If it cannot be shown that GR
is indeed related to LQG in some mathematically well-understood way as the approximately correct
theory when energies are sufficiently low or, equivalently, when scales are sufficiently large, then
LQG cannot explain why GR has been empirically as successful as it has been.21 But a successful
theory can only be legitimately supplanted if the successor theory not only makes novel predictions
or offers deeper explanations, but is also able to replicate the empirical success of the theory it
seeks to replace.
Ultimately, of course, the full analysis will depend on the full articulation of the theory. But
focusing on the kinematical level, and thus avoiding having to fully deal with the problem of time as
must Jeremy Butterfield and Chris Isham (1999, 2001), let me apply their concepts to the problem
of the emergence of full spacetime, rather than just time as they do. They identify three types of
reductive relations between theories: definitional extension, supervenience, and emergence, of which
only the last has any chance of working in the case at hand. For Butterfield and Isham, a theory
T1 emerges from another theory T2 just in case there exists either a limiting or an approximating
procedure to relate the two theories (or a combination of the two). A limiting procedure is taking
the mathematical limit of some physically relevant parameters, in general in a particular order, of
the underlying theory in order to arrive at the emergent theory. A limiting procedure won’t work,
at least not by itself, due to technical problems concerning the maximal loop density as well as
to what essentially amounts to the measurement problem familiar from non-relativistic quantum
physics.
An approximating procedure designates the process of either neglecting some physical magni-
19Cf. Smolin (2009, 549).
20As far as I am aware, the philosophical literature on emergence in canonical quantum gravity is exhausted by
the two articles by Butterfield and Isham cited in the bibliography and Wu¨thrich (2006).
21And successful it has been; cf. Will (2006).
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Figure 2: Applying the scheme proposed by Butterfield and Isham (1999).
tudes, and justifying such neglect, or selecting a proper subset of states in the state space of the
approximating theory, and justifying such selection, or both, in order to arrive at a theory whose
values of physical quantities remain sufficiently close to those of the theory to be approximated.
Note that the “approximandum,” the theory to be approximated, in our case will not be GR, but
only its vacuum sector of spacetimes of topology Σ× R. One of the central questions will be how
the selection of states will be justified. Such a justification would be had if we could identify a
mechanism that “drives the system” to the right kind of states. Any attempt to finding such a
mechanism will foist a host of issues known from the traditional problem of relating quantum to
classical mechanics upon us. A candidate mechanism, here and there, is some form of “decoher-
ence,” even though that standardly involves an “environment” with which the system at stake can
interact. But the system of interest in our case is, of course, the universe, which makes it hard
to see how there could be any outside environment with which the system could interact. The
challenge then is to conceptualize decoherence is a way to circumvents this problem.
Even though much work remains to be done, both in the technical and the philosophical depart-
ments, let me venture the thesis—or should I say “promissory note”—that at least to the extent
to which LQG is a consistent theory, (a close cousin of) GR can be seen to emerge from LQG if a
delicately chosen ordered combination of approximations and limiting procedures is applied. The
claim is illustrated in Figure 2, where it can been seen that the idea would be to first apply an
approximating procedure at the level of the quantum theory with Hilbert space H and a set of
operators {Oˆ} defined on H to drive the physical system to a semi-classical subspace which can
then be related to the classical space of states Γ by a limiting procedure. This is only a very rough
sketch, to be sure, and much detail needs to be added, but a beginning is offered in Wu¨thrich (2006,
Ch. 9).
Once it is understood how classical space and time disappear in canonical quantum gravity and
how they might be seen to re-emerge from the fundamental, non-spatiotemporal structure, the way
in which classicality emerges from the quantum theory of gravity does not radically differ from
the way it is believed to arise in ordinary quantum mechanics. The project of pursuing such an
understanding is of relevance and interest for at least two reasons. First, important foundational
questions concerning the interpretation of, and the relation between, theories are addressed, which
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can lead to conceptual clarification of the foundations of physics. Such conceptual progress may
well prove to be the decisive stepping stone to a full quantum theory of gravity. Second, quantum
gravity is a fertile ground for any metaphysician as it will inevitably yield implications for specifically
philosophical, and particularly metaphysical, issues concerning the nature of space and time.
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